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Speech is a matching problem. Speakers choose listeners, 
and listeners choose speakers. When their choices conflict, 
law often decides who speaks to whom. The pattern is clear: 
First Amendment doctrine consistently honors listeners' 
choices for speech. When willing and unwilling listeners' 
choices conflict, willing listeners win. And when competing 
speakers' choices conflict, listeners'choices break the tie. This 
Essay provides a theoretical framework for analyzing speech 
problems in terms of speakers' and listeners' choices, an ar-
gument for the centrality of listener choice to any coherent 
theory of free speech, and supporting examples from First 
Amendment caselaw. 
INTRODUCTION 
The elevator pitch version of the First Amendment is that 
it protects speakers' choices about what to say.1 The 
* Professor of Law, Cornell Tech and Cornell Law School. This is a revised version 
of a draft presented at the 26th Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Constitutional Law Confer-
ence at the University of Colorado Law School on April 13, 2018. I presented even 
earlier versions of this essay at the 2013 Intellectual Property Scholars Confer-
ence, the 2014 Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, and the Cornell Infor-
mation Science Colloquium in fall 2017. My thanks to the participants there for 
their comments, and to Aislinn Black, Jack Balkin, Bryan Choi, Don Gifford, 
Mark Graber, Kate Klonick, Lawrence Solum, Alexander Tsesis, Rebecca 
Tushnet, and Felix Wu. This essay may be freely reused under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. 
1. E.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("To permit the 
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for 
each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free 
from government censorship."). 
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and topics, government must be neutral among viewpoints 
which means letting speakers say whatever they want. 
2 The 
central task of First Amendment theory and doctrine is to 
explain when and why deviations from this neutrality principle 
are justified. 3 A secondary set of doctrines deal with peripheral 
questions about how speakers speak. 4 
In this Essay, I propose to flip the script. What would First 
started from Amendment theory and doctrine look like if we 
the how of speech, rather than the what? I will reinterpret 
what Thomas Emerson called "the system of freedom of expres-
a mechanism for matching speakers with listeners. I sion"5 as 
speak, how lis-will consider how speakers decide to whom to 
teners decide to whom to listen, and how law creates and re-
solves conflicts among speakers and listeners. In so doing, I 
will mostly abstract away from the content of speech. This 
Essay is concerned with how speakers and listeners find each 
other, not what they say to each other once they do. 6 
From a matching perspective, listeners' choices matter 
more than speakers'. The paradigm case of free speech involves 
a matched pair of a willing speaker and a willing listener. A 
to these willing speaker-consistent commitment protecting 
listener pairs results in a system of First Amendment law that 
regularly defers to listeners' choices. In cases involving 
speaker-speaker conflicts, listeners break the tie. And when 
speakers prevail in speaker-listener conflicts, it is often be-
cause other listeners tip the balance. 
Part I of this essay briefly describes the concept of match-
ing problems, shows how free speech can be recognized as one, 
and highlights a few recurring constraints on possible speaker-
listener matchings. Part II looks closely at different 
above all else, the First Amendment means that government 2. Id. ("But, 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content."). 
3. See, e.g., EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED 
STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS (6th ed. 2016) (devoting 
two chapters and 336 pages to content-based restrictions on speech). 
4. See, e.g., id. (devoting one chapter and 49 pages to content-neutral re-
strictions on speech). 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 (1970). 5. 
Of course, the content of speech gives speakers and listeners their various 6. 
preferences among each other; we cannot pretend that all speech is the same. My 
look, as much as possible, only at point is that important patterns emerge if we 
of the resulting preferences and avoid peeking at the content-based the structure 
reasons motivating them. 
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configurations of willing and unwilling speakers and listeners 
to tease out the matching issues they raise, with particular 
focus on listeners' choices among speakers. Part III discusses a 
few canonical Supreme Court cases as examples of listener-
driven matching. The Conclusion adds a few thoughts on 
listeners' rights and fake news. 
I. MATCHING SPEAKERS AND LISTENERS 
A. Matching Problems 
In mathematics, a "matching" is a way of pairing up the 
members of two sets. A "matching problem" is the challenge of 
finding a matching that satisfies various constraints. One 
familiar example is the "marriage problem": pair up a set of 
male-identifying persons with an equal-size set of female-
identifying persons in a way that maximizes collective happi-
ness. 7 Other familiar matching problems include shoes and 
feet, airplane seats and passengers, organ donors and trans-
plant recipients, articles and law reviews, clerks and judges, 
and medical students and residency programs.8 The unifying 
feature of these problems is that they involve pairwise interac-
tions between members of two asymmetric groups, where the 
individual preferences about with whom to interact are com-
plex, heterogenous, and frequently incompatible. 
Matching problems typically have numerous possible solu-
tions, and different algorithms for choosing matchings yield dif-
ferent ones. Mathematicians who study abstract matching 
problems and operations researchers who study real-world 
matching problems frequently characterize those solutions as 
better or worse along various dimensions, and seek algorithms 
that yield better ones. Some of their results are striking. For 
example, consider the 1962 paper by David Gale and Lloyd 
Shapley that essentially kicked off the study of matching 
problems. 9 In it they consider an algorithm for the marriage 
7. D. Gale & L.S. Shapley, College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, 
69 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 9 (1962). This version of the marriage problem 
is unrepresentative in that a matching marries off everyone; there are other 
matching problems in which not all participants are required to be matched. 
8. For a readable general-audience overview of real-life matching problems 
and their solutions, see ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT-AND WHY: THE NEW 
ECONOMICS OF MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN (2015). 
9. Gale & Shapley, supra note 7. 
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problem in which each unengaged man proposes to the unen-
gaged woman he most wants to marry, and each woman 
accepts the proposal of her favorite current suitor.10 The men 
whose proposals were rejected repeat the process by proposing 
to the next woman on their lists; women break their engage-
ments if a better suitor comes along.II A little surprisingly, this 
frenzied and hard-hearted expression of patriarchy in action is 
guaranteed to result in a matching in which everyone gets 
married. 12 Even more surprisingly, the resulting matching is 
"stable": there is no pair of disappointed lovers who prefer each 
other to their actual spouses. 13 And still more surprisingly (or 
perhaps not at all), this algorithm makes men happier than 
women: out of all possible stable matchings, it selects the one 
that best satisfies men's preferences. 14 If it is the women who 
propose to the men, exactly the reverse is true: the resulting 
stable matching is the one that best satisfies women's 
10. Id. at 12. 
1 1. Id. 
12. Id. at 12-13. If it didn't, there would be a woman Weronika who never 
a man Mateusz who never had a proposal accepted. But accepted a proposal and 
at some point, and she wouldn't have Mateusz must have proposed to Weronika 
turned him down unless she had a proposal in hand from someone else. Since men 
never revoke proposals in the Gale-Shapley algorithm, this contradicts the 
assumption that Weronika ends up unmarried. 
13. Id. at 13. Suppose that Manfred and Wilhelmina would rather be paired 
with each other. Either Manfred proposed to Wilhelmina at some point or he 
didn't. If he did, the reason they're not together is that Wilhelmina must have 
she preferred to rejected his proposal; that is, she ended up paired with someone 
Manfred. But if Manfred never proposed to her, it means he never worked his way 
down his list as far as Wilhelmina; that is, he had a proposal accepted by someone 
he preferred to Wilhelmina. Either way, there is a contradiction with the assump-
tion that Manfred and Wilhelmina would rather be paired with each other. There 
is no such pair of unmatched lovebirds. 
& ROBERT W. IRVING, THE STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: 
STRUCTURE AND ALGORITHMS 11 (1989). Intuitively, the reason is that the Gale-
Shapley algorithm goes only just as far down the men's preference lists as neces-
sary to find a stable matching. When Wilfreda rejects Mortimer's proposal in favor 
14. DAN GUSFIELD 
of Marston's, it shows that any matching pairing Mortimer and Wilfreda is unsta-
ble. Wilfreda's rejection shows that she would rather be paired with Marston than 
prefers Wilfreda to any other Mortimer, and Marston's proposal shows that he 
not already rejected him. No matter whomever else Marston woman who has 
might be paired with in a matching pairing Mortimer and Wilfreda, Marston and 
would rather be paired with each other. Since any attempt to rejigger Wilfreda 
the pairings in Mortimer's favor makes the resulting matching unstable, it means 
that the actual matching is the best Mortimer can do out of all possible stable 
matchings. 
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preferences.' 5 Thus, the choice of matching algorithm has both 
allocational and distributional consequences. 
The stable marriage problem is a toy mathematical exam-
ple. But real-life matching problems have high stakes. Finding 
a good matching algorithm is immensely important. The resi-
dency match is a good example of the practical politics of 
matching.1 6 Medical students "propose" to residencies, so that 
the system is designed to favor students' preferences among 
programs over programs' preferences among students, while 
retaining stability.' 7 In the 1990s, the algorithm was tweaked 
so that student couples could enter the match as a pair and re-
ceive geographically compatible matches if possible, but with-
out favoring one member of the couple over the other. 18 Organ 
donations are another example where designing good matching 
mechanisms has immense payoffs.1 9 Maximizing the number of 
compatible donor-donee pairs is literally a matter of life and 
death.20 
We do not need to go further into the mathematical details 
of matching problems here. 2 1 My points are few and simple. 
First, matching problems are everywhere. Second, matching 
problems have better and worse solutions. A world with algo-
rithms that find kidney donation chains is better than a world 
without those algorithms; fewer people die waiting for a kidney 
to become available. Third, "better" and "worse" are often both 
relative and political. A world where men propose to women is 
better for men; a world where women propose to men is better 
for women. Fourth, all real-life matching problems are "solved" 
in the sense that there is a matching. At any given time, 
15. Id. 
16. See generally Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the 
Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic 
Design, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 748 (1999). 
17. See ROTH, supra note 8, at 133-44. 
18. Id. at 144-49. See generally Roth & Peranson, supra note 16. 
19. See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth et al., Kidney Exchange, 119 Q.J. ECON. 457 (2004). 
20. See Itai Ashlagi et al., Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney-
Paired Donation-Revisited, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 984 (2011). 
21. For those who are interested, two elegant and illuminating treatments of 
matching algorithms can be found in JON KLEINBERG & EVA TARDOS, ALGORITHM 
DESIGN (2006) and DONALD E. KNUTH, STABLE MARRIAGE AND ITS RELATION TO 
OTHER COMBINATORIAL PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS (Martin Goldstein trans., 1989). An exhaustive treat-
ment of the stable marriage problem and its many extensions is GUSFIELD & 
IRVING, supra note 14. 
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and others certain people are married to certain other people, 
are unmarried. That is a matching. 2 2 Fifth, there are many 
different matching mechanisms. Some, like school assignments 
in many districts, are explicit: they are the output of purpose-
built algorithms. Some, like the placement of feet in shoes, are 
implicit: they rely on uncoordinated social processes. And sixth, 
mechanism choice bears on both the quality and the fairness of 
the resulting matching. As the persistence of divorce shows, the 
is neither optimal nor stable. real-life marriage matching 
Matching matters. 
B. Speech as a Matching Problem 
Speech is a matching problem. Speakers speak; listeners 
listen. In each case, the question is to whom? I might at any 
given moment be listening to a politician's speech, an adver-
tisement for dish soap, a friend's endless nattering about base-
ball, or a subway rapper's freestyling exploits. The politician 
might, at any given moment, be speaking to a national audi-
ence on C-SPAN, a potential donor on the telephone, a col-
league, a sibling, a reporter, or a therapist, to name just a few 
more. 
Some numbers may illustrate the scale of the problem. 
at any given time, one billion of Earth's seven Suppose that, 
billion people are speaking in some form, and another billion 
are listening. That gives each listener a billion different choices 
of where to direct her attention. 23 But that is just one listener. 
The number of ways to find a speaker for every listener is 
vastly larger. Each such matching is a list a billion lines long 
(the number of listeners); each line in such a list has one of a 
billion possible values (the number of speakers).24 The number 
22. It is not a matching that satisfies the constraints of the stable marriage 
problem (which requires that everyone be paired off). It is a matching that satis-
general problem in which people's rank-ordered fies the constraints of the more 
preferences can include "unmarried" as well as potential partners. 
23. See generally JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HISTORY, A THEORY, A 
FLOOD (2011). Information overload is hardly a new problem. See generally ANN 
KNow: MANAGING SCHOLARLY INFORMATION BEFORE M. BLAIR, TOO MUCH TO 
THE MODERN AGE (2010); ALEX WRIGHT, GLUT: MASTERING INFORMATION 
THROUGH THE AGES (2007). 
24. Here is a simplified illustration of the problem. Suppose there are two 
Xu, Yaz, and Zelda. Then there are listeners, Alice and Bob, and three speakers, 
nine possible matchings: 
* Alice listens to Xu, and Bob listens to Xu. 
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of possible matchings is thus one billion to the billionth power, 
or 109,000,000,000. That is a one followed by nine billion zeroes, a 
number that defies human comprehension. And yet, every 
minute of every day, speakers and listeners settle on one of 
these different matchings. 
Different matchings serve the goals of information policy 
differently. Consider a matching in which the Qin Emperor 
speaks and everyone on earth listens, a matching in which 
people talk only to their closest neighbor, and a matching in 
which each speaker has a randomly chosen pen pal. Each of 
these matchings is badly deficient. The first is dictatorial, the 
second fragmented, the third chaotic. We should hope to do bet-
ter. Not matching is not an option; one way or another, the 
choice will be made. The alternative to matching speakers with 
listeners is no speech. 
A few factors are particularly important in determining 
which of the 109,000,000,000 or so matchings we end up with. Most 
obviously, speakers and listeners constantly make choices. 
When Spike comes up to Liz at a party and starts shouting in 
her ear about the Federal Reserve, he is a speaker selecting her 
as a listener. When Liz flees to the den and turns on the 
Orioles game instead, she is a listener selecting different 
speakers: the game's announcers. Sometimes, third parties-
such as the state or media intermediaries-make these choices 
for listeners. When a flash-flood warning starts scrolling across 
the bottom of the screen, the government and the TV station 
intervene to redirect Liz's attention away from the announcers' 
speech and to the Emergency Warning System's speech in-
stead. 
Although every matching is a product of billions of human 
choices, these choices are not unbounded. They take place 
within an extensive framework of geographic, linguistic, 
* Alice listens to Xu, and Bob listens to Yaz. 
* Alice listens to Xu, and Bob listens to Zelda. 
* Alice listens to Yaz, and Bob listens to Xu. 
* Alice listens to Yaz, and Bob listens to Yaz. 
* Alice listens to Yaz, and Bob listens to Zelda. 
* Alice listens to Zelda, and Bob listens to Xu. 
* Alice listens to Zelda, and Bob listens to Yaz. 
* Alice listens to Zelda, and Bob listens to Zelda. 
If there are n listeners and m speakers, then there are mn distinct matchings that 
assign each listener a speaker. Here, n=2 because there are two listeners, and 
m=3 because there are three speakers, for a total of 32=9 possible assignments. 
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economic, cultural, and technological constraints. Spike lives in 
Missouri, not Malaysia. He doesn't speak Malay. He doesn't 
have the money for a plane ticket. And, to be honest, not that 
many people, here or in Kuala Lumpur, are interested in his 
conspiracy theories about the Federal Reserve. Past choices by 
speakers and listeners, by governments, and by third parties, 
play out in present constraints. Spike's decision to major in 
Spanish affects whom he can effectively speak to or listen to. So 
do the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824-and the 
countless other past events that we collectively refer to as "his-
tory." Speakers and listeners make choices, but they make 
them against a backdrop of choices already made, choices that 
make certain matchings infeasible. 
Although there are good reasons to try to honor the 
matching choices made by speakers and listeners, it would be 
inadvisable to honor every such choice. Indeed, it would be 
impossible. Three intrinsic limits are important. 
First, people's choices about speech, like people's choices 
about everything, almost always fall short of the theoretical 
ideal of fully informed and fully rational decision-making. 
Some things we do end up being unintentional choices about 
speech, as when George W. Bush referred to a New York Times 
reporter as a "major league asshole" in front of a microphone he 
didn't realize was on, or when a tenant rents an apartment 
near a nightclub that's far louder than she expects. Other times 
we make conscious choices to speak or to listen that we later 
regret, as when I saw the Brian De Palma/Nicolas Cage turkey 
Snake Eyes on opening weekend. I call these internal limits on 
choices about speech: people make mistakes when they choose 
whom to speak to or listen to. Put another way, "choice" itself is 
a constructed category. Sometimes we regard people's actions 
as sincere expressions of their preferences about speech when 
they are nothing of the sort, and vice versa. 
Second, some combinations of choices are physically or 
logically impossible. These are structural limits on how many 
choices it is possible to honor at once. If I want every person on 
Earth to stop what they're doing and hear me simultaneously 
as I issue ransom demands from my evil lair deep within the 
sun, it is simply not going to happen. If two aging arena-
rockers both want to play to a sold-out crowd at Madison 
Square Garden on the same evening, there is no way to make 
both of them happy. If I want to tell you about trademark law 
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and you would rather watch Game of Thrones, one of us is 
going to be disappointed. Physical, geographical, and infra-
structural factors create structural limits on choice. So do 
disagreements among speakers and listeners. 
Third, choice is not the only important value. As a society 
we put external limits on choice by trading it off against other 
important values. These values are familiar: they are the 
harms to society and to third parties that weigh against speak-
ers' rights to say whatever they want. A bomb-bearing listener 
and a speaker explaining where inside a train station to deto-
nate a bomb to cause maximum carnage might choose to com-
municate with each other. But there is a strong social interest 
in minimizing carnage; we have good reasons to interfere with 
their choices here. 
C. Scarcities 
Internal, structural, and external limits are general fea-
tures of speaker-listener matching. They play out differently in 
different contexts. Three specific constraints on speaker and 
listener choices are common and important enough to require 
separate discussion. They are speakers' limited capacity to get 
their speech to listeners (bandwidth), listeners' limited capac-
ity to listen to multiple speakers at once (attention), and listen-
ers' limited information about what speakers will say in the 
future (ignorance). Bandwidth and attention are structural 
limits; ignorance is an internal limit. 
1. Bandwidth 
Basic characteristics of the media that people use to 
speak-capacity, range, audience, and cost-shape who speaks 
to whom.25 Compare a fiber-optic network with a network of tin 
cans connected by string. A major fiber-optic cable can transmit 
many thousands of high-resolution cat videos per hour; a pair 
of tin cans can handle one low-fidelity voice conversation. 
Fiber-optic networks can reach billions of people while the tin 
cans let you reach one at a time. Fiber-optic networks span the 
25. See generally MARSHALL T. POE, A HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS: MEDIA 
AND SOCIETY FROM THE EVOLUTION OF SPEECH TO THE INTERNET (2011) (discuss-
ing media in terms of accessibility, privacy, fidelity, volume, velocity, range, 
persistence, and searchability, and from both speaker and listeners' perspective). 
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globe; the tin cans will barely get you from here to next door. 
But while almost anyone can build and deploy a local-area 
point-to-point personal tin-can network, transcontinental cable 
laying has always been reserved for the few, the regulated, the 
well-capitalized. 
speaker-Pre-modern media sharply limited the set of 
listener matchings. They had low capacities, variable but typi-
cally limited ranges, small audiences, and moderate to low 
a costs. An unamplified public speaker can be heard by few 
hundred people who must be gathered in the same place as the 
speaker; a handwritten letter can travel the globe but can only 
be read by a handful of people at once. Some kinds of match-
ings are simply incompatible with these limits; a listener circa 
220 A.D. in Rome would not have been physically capable of 
hearing a speaker in Xi'an. 
The pre-Internet mass media that dominated the twen-
tieth century-particularly, television, radio, and mass-
produced artifacts like newspapers, books, and records-were 
national different. They had large capacity, large audiences, 
range, and high costs.26 This made bandwidth a crucial bottle-
neck between speakers and listeners, and one with a charac-
use of teristic structure. A limited set of speakers could make 
these media, but those with access could then reach very large 
audiences. These media allowed a few to speakers reach large 
numbers of listeners. They did not let large numbers of speak-
ers each reach smaller but scattered audiences. 
Contrast the characteristic twenty-first century medium: 
the Internet, an astoundingly high-capacity network that spans 
the globe, has billions of users, and enables famously "cheap 
speech." 27 There are disparities among speakers, to be sure, of 
wealth, class, power, nationality, gender, language, education, 
and many others. Not everyone can push out a two-hour, high-
definition video to a million viewers precisely at midnight-but 
almost anyone can get a book's worth of text to a few hundred 
or few thousand readers within minutes, or 280 characters to 
millions of readers within seconds. Generally speaking, anyone 
26. Id. at 101-51 (discussing print), 152-201 (discussing audiovisual media). 
27. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 
1805 (1995). 
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can speak to a worldwide audience of any size for the cost of a 
basic smartphone: in some places as low as $20.28 
These shifts in media also shift who holds the power to 
choose among possible speaker-listener matchings. Wherever 
there is a speech-transmission bottleneck, there is also a 
speech-selection bottleneck. Almost all the speech-selection 
power in mass pre-Internet media rests with those who choose 
which speech will be "pushed" through those media. Speakers 
either have access to the medium or do not; listeners' choices 
are limited to ordering from the speech menu placed before 
them, and the menu is not long. In such an environment, the 
capacity constraints both force an upstream choice among 
speakers and make that choice inherently controversial. 
Speakers, government, conduit operators, and various interest 
groups will all have claims about which speakers should be 
given access. Listeners' choices may provide rhetorical support 
for certain ways of deciding among speakers, and some of those 
ways will attempt to ascertain what listeners in general would 
prefer, but individual listeners will not be able to exercise 
choice as listeners over which speakers receive access. 
Bandwidth is different on the Internet because transmis-
sion capacity no longer creates a chokepoint that forces an 
early upstream choice of a sharply restricted set of speakers. 
Speaker-listener matchings are no longer determined in the 
first instance by access to the mass media; listeners no longer 
experience the sharply restricted set of choices among speech 
characteristic of the mass media. Provided they know it exists 
and where it is to be found, listeners can "pull" the speech they 
want from its source. This can shift some control over speaker-
listener matchings downstream, closer to listeners.29 (This 
shift, we will see, tends to advance free speech goals. 30) 
28. See Jamie Carter, The Land of the $20 Smartphone, TECHRADAR (Mar. 11, 
2017), https://www.techradar.comnews/the-land-of-the-20-smartphone [perma.cc/ 
4BYP-2V9Y]. 
29. Interestingly, it is generally older work, from the first flourishing of legal 
scholarship about the Internet, that best articulates the close connection between 
an abundance of speech and listener choice. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, 
Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377; Volokh, 
supra note 27; Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: 
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive 
Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619 (1995). 
30. See infra Part II. 
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2. Attention 
There is an important asymmetry between speakers and 
listeners. Speech, being information, is infinitely replicable. 
Nothing in the nature of speech itself prevents a speaker's 
message from reaching the entire world, given sufficient time, 
rea-effort, and expense. A speaker might lower her voice for 
sons of privacy or discretion, but she does not have to. Speak-
ing to one listener does little to detract from her ability to reach 
a second. 
The vis vitae of listening, however, is not speech but atten-
tion, and human attention is always and everywhere limited. 
Listeners consume speech nonrivalrously, but speech consumes 
listeners' attention rivalrously. 31 If I am reading a book, I will 
have a much harder time also paying attention to the news on 
the radio. Unlike speakers, listeners must choose. Listeners 
have an overwhelming array of choices in the modern media 
environment. But they still only have two eyes, two ears, and 
one brain. 
Limited attention particularly matters now because there 
are billions of speakers in the world, and millions of them are 
trying to reach a public audience. And since media bandwidth 
no longer stands in the way, almost all of their speech is actual-
ly available to interested listeners. In this sense, listeners are 
inundated with choices. There are millions of speakers who are 
ready, willing, and able to address them. But it also means that 
these speakers are competing fiercely with each other for audi-
ences. A previously buried constraint on speech-listeners' 
limited attention-is now closer to the surface. 32 
Attention functions differently than mass-media scarcities. 
For one thing, it is distributed: each listener controls only a 
tiny fraction of the world's supply. For another, it can be taken 
31. A good is rivalrous if one consumer's use prevents others from using it. It 
is nonrivalrous if any number of consumers can use it at no additional cost. 
32. Herbert Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, 
in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41 (M. 
Greenberger ed., 1971) ("Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of atten-
a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of tion and 
information sources that might consume it."); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment 
Obsolete?, in KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE, EMERGING THREATS 7 (David 
Pozen ed., 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete 
[perma.cc/8AB3-FVAK] ("[Ijt is no longer speech or information that is scarce, but 
the attention of listeners."). 
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involuntarily: just.try to read on the subway when there is a 
crying baby or an apocalyptic preacher standing next to you. 
For a third, it can be attacked indirectly. As Zeynep Tufekci 
powerfully argues, censorship today is best understood as 
denial of attention: a government can thwart an opposition 
movement either by keeping the media from reporting on pro-
tests (traditional "censorship") or by swamping the media with 
distractions, disinformation, and noise, so that few people 
watch the news reports or believe them. 33 Keeping people from 
knowing about speech can be just as effective as keeping the 
speech itself from them, and so can keeping them too distracted 
to pay attention to it. 34 
3. Ignorance 
There is another important asymmetry between speakers 
and listeners. Because speakers produce information and 
listeners consume it, listeners always choose from a position of 
partial ignorance in a way that speakers do not. Speech, being 
information, is subject to Arrow's information paradox. 35 A lis-
tener who has not yet heard speech is not capable of making a 
fully informed evaluation of it.36 Once she has heard the 
speech, she is in a better position to assess whether it is worth 
listening to--but by then it is too late. The speech cannot be 
unheard. 
To repeat, this is a matter of asymmetry between speakers 
and listeners. Speakers have excellent knowledge of the speech 
they are about to engage in. Listeners have no such advantage: 
if someone catches your eye on the sidewalk, you don't know 
33. ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF 
NETWORKED PROTEST 239 (2017). 
34. See MARGARET E. ROBERTS, CENSORED: DISTRACTION AND DIVERSION 
INSIDE CHINA'S GREAT FIREWALL 41-92 (2018) (adding "friction" and "flooding" to 
"fear" as mechanisms of censorship). 
35. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIc ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962) ("[T]here is a fundamental paradox in the deter-
mination of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until 
he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost."). 
36. This is also a version of the learner's paradox from Plato's Meno. "How 
will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you 
aim to search for something you do not know at all?" PLATO, PLATO: FIVE 
DIALOGUES: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, MENO, PHAEDO 70 (John M. Cooper 
ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., 2d ed. 2002). 
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what they want. Maybe they want to rant at you about the gold 
standard, or tell you about an art gallery opening, or ask for 
directions to the train station, or get your signature on a politi-
cal petition. You can guess, but you can't know. Only they can. 
One common manifestation of listeners' limited 
knowledge-or at least one commonly asserted in the free 
over un-speech literature-is a preference for familiar speech 
familiar. Some listeners are like six-year-olds demanding to 
watch The Little Mermaid for the eighty-ninth time: they know 
what they like and see no need to venture beyond it. Others are 
like Sam I Am turning up his nose at green eggs and ham; they 
are unwilling to give speech a proper hearing, even if in hind-
sight they would have been glad to have heard it. 
Another manifestation of listeners' ignorance is that 
speakers are sometimes in a position to deceive listeners about 
their speech. Clickbait is a simple example. This Headline 
Promises Shocking Revelations. The Article Will Underwhelm 
You. False speech also plays on listeners' ignorance. A fully in-
formed listener would not typically choose speech that is 
fraudulent or defamatory; more often, listeners to actionably 
false speech are listening to it only because the speaker has 
successfully hidden its falsity from them. 
And a third way in which listeners' ignorance plays out is 
that simply finding the speech they want can be a massive 
challenge in an age of informational abundance. 37 Easing the 
selection prob-transmission bottleneck makes the underlying 
lem salient in a new way. It was easy to see what was on TV 
when there were only three channels. Now, not so much. The 
are selec-characteristic media companies of the Internet age 
tion intermediaries: search engines, portals, advertising net-
works, social networks, news aggregators, recommendation en-
gines, marketing analytics providers, and the many others who 
specialize in pairing up speakers and listeners. 38 These inter-
mediaries have a significant informational advantage over 
speakers and listeners, and thus a significant power to shape 
a version of this problem: they don't know which potential 
listeners in the world would be most receptive to their speech. But while speakers 
are ignorant about listeners, listeners are ignorant about the speech itself. 
37. Speakers face 
38. Some of these intermediaries are also transmission intermediaries: they 
make speech available or deliver it to listeners, in addition to identifying speech of 
interest to listeners or listeners of interest to speakers. The roles are conceptually 
distinct, even when a single entity performs both. 
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speaker-listener matchings by making different suggestions. 
They vary not just in how much of this power they retain for 
themselves, but also in whether they tilt more toward listeners 
or speakers in their matchmaking. Search engines are highly 
listener directed: different queries let users seek out different 
speech.39 Advertising engines that let marketers slice and dice 
their target eyeballs along thousands of demographic and be-
havioral axes are highly speaker-directed. 40  Facebook's 
algorithmic News Feed is somewhere in between: it nudges us-
ers into reading friends' posts in a default, Facebook-selected 
order while giving users some controls to tweak that order and 
the ability to speak directly to or listen directly to specific other 
users they choose. 4 1 
II. THE CENTRALITY OF LISTENER CHOICE 
So much for what we can do about speaker and listener 
choices. Now for what we should do. Or perhaps, I should say, 
what we must do. This Part makes a simple argument: any 
theory of free speech that does not take listener choice seri-
ously fails as a theory of free speech. It is not necessary to 
delve deeply into the normative justifications for free speech. 
Whatever those justifications are, they must protect the entire 
communicative pathway from willing speaker to willing lis-
tener. And once they do, they cannot effectively protect speak-
ers who have willing listeners unless they also frequently 
protect unwilling listeners from unwanted speakers. This con-
clusion follows from the structural constraints on speaker and 
listener choice imposed by other speakers and other listeners. 
It is inherent in the nature of speech in a world with many 
people in it. 
39. See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 894, 
898-900 (2014) (arguing that good listener-directed selection is normatively desir-
able). 
40. See generally JOSEPH TUROw, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND 
THE NEW MEDIA WORLD (1997) (giving history of targeted advertising); JOSEPH 
TUROW, THE DAILY You: How THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING 
YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH (2011) (continuing history into Internet era). 
41. See generally TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: 
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE 
SOCIAL MEDIA (2018) (describing in detail how Facebook and other social media 
platforms comprehensively filter, sort, and structure the content that flows be-
tween users). 
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This is a content-neutral analysis. It genuinely does not 
care what the speech at issue is. It does not matter what good 
it does for speakers, listeners, or society. It does not matter 
what harms it is capable of. I will use speeches about the 
mayor as an example, but absolutely nothing will turn on the 
need to know about the speech is specifics. The only things we 
and which which listeners the speakers are trying to reach 
speakers the listeners would like to hear. We do not need to 
look inside their choices or inquire after their reasons; it mat-
ters only that the speakers and listeners have reasons they 
consider sufficient. 
A. Willing Listeners 
The standard justifications of free speech take as their 
paradigm case a willing speaker facing a willing listener. 
42 We 
can depict this case graphically, and with a simple hypothet-
ical: 
Core Free Speech: S gives a speech criticizing the 
mayor. L is in the audience. 
This is the paradigm case for free speech. S is a willing 
speaker, L a willing listener. They form a matched pair: S and 
L both want L to hear what S has to say. In such a setting, it is 
possible to be imprecise about whose interests are at stake be-
cause it does not really matter. Speakers and listeners pull the 
same oar. Treating the relevant interests as belonging purely 
to speakers, purely to listeners, or jointly to speakers and lis-
teners makes no significant difference. 
When I refer to a "willing" speaker, I mean one who affirmatively wants to 42. 
be heard by a specific listener or listeners; when I refer to a "willing" listener, I 
mean one who affirmatively wants to hear a specific speaker. "Willing" and 
"unwilling" are relational terms. There are cases of pure self-expression in which 
who listens. And there are rare cases of compelled speech a speaker doesn't care 
in which a speaker just wants to be silent and the government doesn't care about 
any particular listener. Set these both aside for now. 
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To emphasize the point, consider the different ways that 
the authorities could interfere with the speaker-listener rela-
tionship between S and L. 
Arrested Speaker: S gives a speech criticizing the 
mayor. L is in the audience. The police arrest S. 
L S 
Air Horns: S gives a speech criticizing the mayor. L is 
in the audience. The police stand in the room blowing 
air horns. 
Arrested Listener: S gives a speech criticizing the 
mayor. L is in the audience. The police arrest L. 
In Arrested Speaker, the police have prevented S from 
speaking. This is an obvious and obviously unconstitutional re-
striction on speech. The net effect is that L is unable to hear 
what S has to say. This is censorship, plain and simple. 
In Air Horns, the police have not literally prevented S from 
speaking. But the air horns are just as effective as an arrest in 
figuratively silencing S. This too is censorship. The First 
Amendment cares about more than just S's ability to vibrate 
her vocal cords or to scribble on a piece of paper. S's freedom of 
speech will be poorly protected indeed if the government can 
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interdict her speech before it reaches L. 43 There is nothing 
wrong in general with police use of air horns: they are useful, 
for example, to warn citizens of serious danger from a building 
demolition. Rather, the problem in Air Horns is that the police 
officer has used the air horn to thwart an act of communication 
involving both a speaker and a listener. The idea of a listener is 
inherent in speech and, hence, is also inherent in free speech. 
Although Arrested Listener is a little less common, it too is 
a restriction on speech. Just as in Air Horns, the police have 
not literally prevented S from speaking. But arresting the audi-
ence has the same effect as arresting the speaker or blowing air 
horns because, again, L is unable to hear what S has to say. If 
Arrested Speaker is a paradigm case of a restraint on speech, 
then so are Air Horns and Arrested Listener. What matters is 
that the state has broken the communicative pathway from 
speaker to listener, not where along the pathway it has acted. 
The right to receive speech is the "reciprocal" of the right to 
speak." Each is meaningless without the other. A system that 
does not protect the freedom to listen will not effectively protect 
the freedom to speak, and vice versa. 
This may sound like an expansion of the domain of free 
speech. In a sense it is. The protected communicative pathway 
extends farther, until it reaches a listener. But in another im-
portant sense it is a contraction. We are not concerned with 
speech as speech (involving only a speaker), but with speech as 
communication (involving both a speaker and a listener). On 
the former, core free speech protections attach when someone 
speaks; interference with the success of the speaker's project is 
suspect. On the latter, core free speech protections attach when 
someone speaks and someone listens; interference with the 
success of their joint communicative project is suspect. This is a 
narrower principle because it requires both a speaker and a lis-
tener. We can test this principle's reach with a pair of cases: 
43. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974) ("Communication by 
letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effect-
ed only when the letter is read by the addressee."), overruled by Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
44. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 757 (1976) ("If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to 
receive the advertising . . . ."). 
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Lonely Speaker: S gives a speech criticizing the mayor 
in a forest with no one else around until the police 
arrive to arrest S. 
Lonely Listener: L stands in a forest listening to the 
wind with no one else around until the police arrive to 
arrest L. 
We might regard these as free speech cases. Or we might 
not. A theory focused on speakers' and listeners' personal liber-
ty might regard these arrests as problematic; a theory focused 
on democratic discourse might not. It is possible to articulate 
theories of free speech that do and do not protect speakers 
without listeners and listeners without speakers, a strong indi-
cation that these cases are not of the same importance to free 
speech as cases with both. Arrested Speaker, Air Horns, and 
Arrested Listener are core cases for free speech. Lonely Speaker 
and Lonely Listener are not. 
B. Unwilling Listeners 
Unwilling-listener cases may not seem central to free 
speech, but they are. Their ubiquity makes them invisible. 
Most lack the high drama of the Westboro Baptist Church's 
funeral protests. 45 But that is because our system sorts them 
out almost automatically. Most unwanted speakers never even 
get close to their targets. Screening out vast oceans of unwant-
ed speech is an essential feature of any system that makes free 
speech possible. Getting the paradigm willing-listener case 
right depends, as a practical matter, on getting immense 
45. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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numbers of unwilling-listener cases right as well. And if we do 
not, it is not just listeners but speakers who suffer.46 
In willing-listener cases like Air Horns, the state had an 
option-do nothing-that would satisfy both S and L. But if L 
is an unwilling listener, the state has no such option. Consider: 
Bored Audience: S gives a speech criticizing the mayor. 
L, who is within hearing range, would like to get up 
and leave. 
S and L have a structural conflict because, no matter what 
the state does, there is no matching that will make everyone 
happy. If the state leaves matters alone (or sends a police 
officer to silence S), L will be happy and S will not. But if the 
state intervenes by stationing a police officer to keep L in her 
seat, S will be happy and L will not.47 We need some principled 
basis on which to decide whose choices will be respected. 
46. Unwilling speakers also raise interesting issues, and there are both 
significant parallels and significant differences between compelled speech and 
compelled listening. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment 
Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939 (2009) (comparing com-
pelled speech and compelled listening). But teasing out the differences in relation 
to speaker-listener matching is a matter for another occasion. 
47. Readers who prefer to break the tie in favor of state passivity should 
consider another hypothetical: Loud Speakers: 
S sets up an amplifier and speakers on the sidewalk in front of L's house 
and gives a speech at 95 decibels. L would prefer not to listen. Loud 
Speakers has the same structure of speaker and listener choices as Bored 
Audience: a willing speaker facing an unwilling listener. The difference 
is that in Bored Audience the listener has an effective self-help technique 
to win the speaker-listener conflict, whereas in Loud Speakers it is the 
speaker with the effective self-help. Thus in Loud Speakers, if the state 
does nothing, it satisfies S but not L. If it intervenes to make S go away 
or unplug the speakers, it satisfies L but not S. It is easily possible to 
distinguish Loud Speakers, see generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 
(1949) (upholding municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of amplified 
sound trucks), but not on the basis of a general rule about state-versus-
private action. Whatever line we draw will have the effect of determining 
how people can and cannot speak and when they must or need not listen 
to others' speech, and will have to be normatively justified in view of 
those consequences. Appealing to property law (e.g., that S speaks from 
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It is common to assert that in such cases the Supreme 
Court has chosen to favor speakers over listeners. For example, 
in Snyder v. Phelps, Chief Justice Roberts reiterated that "the 
Constitution does not permit the government to decide which 
types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to 
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer." 48 This 
view is not so much wrong as incomplete. There are three pat-
terns of unwilling-listener cases, and they raise different kinds 
of issues. The simplest involve one-to-one speech, pitting a 
speaker who wants to be heard against a listener who does not 
want to hear. 49 Other cases involve one-to-many speech, in 
which a speaker addresses a large and possibly indeterminate 
audience, not all of whom are interested in what she has to say. 
Finally, some cases involve many-to-one speech, in which mul-
tiple speakers compete for the attention of a listener. If this 
part of First Amendment law seems confused and contradic-
tory, it may stem from a failure to distinguish among these 
patterns. 
The existence of one-to-many and many-to-one cases com-
plicates the story. Paradigm cases of unwilling listeners involv-
ing one-to-one speech appear to pose a choice between favoring 
speakers' attempts to be heard and favoring unwilling listen-
ers' attempts not to hear. But in one-to-many cases, there is 
also a listener-listener conflict: some would like the speaker to 
continue, while others would like her to shut up. Whatever the 
state does will frustrate some listeners. And in many-to-one 
cases, there is also a speaker-speaker conflict: each speaker 
would like to prevail over the others. Whatever the state does 
will frustrate some speakers. 
There is no general speaker-favoring or listener-favoring 
solution to unwilling-listener cases. Some speakers and some 
listeners will inevitably be disappointed. One-to-many cases 
show that favoring unwilling listeners over speakers can frus-
trate other listeners, while many-to-one cases show that 
a public sidewalk or that S creates a nuisance) merely begs the question, 
as the contours of property law are themselves contestable in terms of 
the balance they strike between S and L. 
48. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)). 
49. The helpful terminology to distinguish "one-to-one" speech from "one-to-
many" speech is taken from Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech us. One-to-Many 
Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and "Cyberstalking," 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731 
(2013). I have added the term "many-to-one." 
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favoring speakers over unwilling listeners can frustrate other 
speakers. But paradoxically, these intractable tensions help us 
understand what is truly at stake even in one-to-one cases. 
1. One-to-Many 
Speaker-listener conflicts are rarely just about a speaker 




Controversial Protest: S gives a speech criticizing the 
mayor and would like to reach as many listeners as 
possible. L1 and L2 are within hearing range. Li is 
not interested in listening to S; L2 is. 
Controversial Protest has Bored Audience embedded within 
it because Li is an unwilling listener. S would prefer to speak 
to her while Li would prefer not to be spoken to. Just as in 
Bored Audience, it is not possible to make both S and LI happy. 
Silencing S favors Li over S, but allowing S to continue favors 
S over L1. Again, we must decide, as between S and L1, whose 
choices to respect. 
But we also have another decision to make, because Li 
and L2s choices are in tension as well. If S continues, her 
speech will reach both Li and L2, satisfying L2 but frustrating 
L1. If S shuts up, her speech will reach no one, satisfying Li 
but frustrating L2. The two listeners' choices about S cannot 
both be honored. One of them will go home unhappy. 50 We 
50. Changing the physical structure of the problem changes its conceptual 
structure, as well. If L1 can leave or wear headphones, or if S and L2 can 
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cannot make the decision between them simply by appealing to 
a principle of satisfying all listeners' choices, or as many as 
possible. If we intervene in the name of listeners' choices to 
satisfy L1, we also harm listeners' choices by frustrating L2, 
and vice-versa. Controversial Protest poses both a speaker-
listener and a listener-listener conflict. 
These two decisions are linked: S and L2 are united 
against L1. If S speaks, both S and L2 are satisfied. If S does 
not, both are frustrated. This observation holds the key to the 
hypothetical, because there is something distinctive and special 
about S and L2 in free speech terms. They are a willing 
speaker addressing a willing listener-the easiest case for 
protected speech. Put another way, Controversial Protest also 
has Core Free Speech embedded within it. Thus, if S is silenced 
in Controversial Protest, the state interferes with speech just as 
much as it does in Arrested Speaker,5' just with a different pro-
posed justification. If S is allowed to speak, the state frustrates 
Li's desire not to listen, but this is not the paradigm case of 
preventing desired speech from reaching its audience. 
Thus, any coherent free speech principle will tend to favor 
willing listeners over unwilling ones. If Li's and L2's choices as 
listeners are inextricably bound up with and opposed to each 
other, then the pro-speech outcome comes closer to the core 
willing-listener ideal for free speech than the anti-speech out-
come. Listener choices for speech trump listener choices 
against speech when the two conflict. Moreover, the difference 
between Bored Audience-in which S's claims as a speaker 
against the unwilling L were ambiguous-and Controversial 
Protest-in which S's claims as a speaker against the unwilling 
Li are unambiguous-is precisely the presence of the addi-
tional, willing listener L2. Without L2, this is a hard case; with 
L2, it becomes an easy one. 
It follows that we should be careful not to mistake one-to-
many for one-to-one cases. Sometimes-as with harassing tele-
phone calls-there really is only a single relevant listener. But 
at other times-as with funeral protests-there may be other 
listeners. The presence or absence of other listeners can be a 
reason to treat these cases differently. 
communicate in sign, the conflict may be substantially defused. See infra Section 
II.C. 
51. Or in Air Horns or Arrested Listener. 
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2. Many-to-One 
Just as other listeners may have an interest in the out-




Dueling Speeches: S1 is giving a speech criticizing the 
mayor. In the room next door, S2 is giving a speech 
praising the mayor. L would like to attend S2s speech. 
Si and S2 are both speakers. They would both like to 
speak to L. But those goals are incompatible; L can only attend 
one of the two speeches. 
S1 and S2, however, do not have equal claims on L's atten-
tion. As against S2, L is a willing listener. Thus, Dueling 
Speeches has Core Free Speech embedded within it. The police 
officer who compels L to attend Si's speech rather than S2s in 
Dueling Speeches has interfered with S2s ability to communi-
cate with L just as much as the police officer who arrests L in 
Arrested Listener. The same considerations that led us to say 
the state interferes with S's freedom of speech in Arrested 
Listener52 should lead us to say that it also interferes with S2s 
freedom of speech by dragging L from S2s audience into Si's. 
The effect on S2's speech is the same. 
S1 has a harder time making a similar claim. As against 
S1, L is an unwilling listener, because L would rather be listen-
ing to S2. (This is Bored Audience again, embedded within 
Dueling Speeches.) If the state assists L in escaping from Si's 
auditorium, S1 may be frustrated, but this is the lesser harm of 
52. Or in Air Horns or Arrested Speaker. 
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taking sides in the tug-of-war between speaker and listener, 
not the greater harm of standing between a willing speaker 
and a willing listener. The two conflicts in Dueling Speeches-
S1 versus S2 as speakers competing for the same audience, and 
S1 versus L as a speaker trying to reach an unwilling 
listener-are bound up with each other. L is simultaneously an 
unwilling listener (to Si) and a willing listener (to S2). 
Once again, the asymmetry here comes entirely from a 
single source: L's choice as a listener selecting among speakers. 
On any theory of free speech that cares about listeners' choices 
in their own right, this is an easy tie to break. L chooses S2, 
not Si. But even a theory that purports to care only about 
speakers' choices will still tend to prefer S2 to S1, because S2 
and L stand in the paradigm free speech relationship of willing 
speaker and willing listener, whereas S1 and L do not. To 
choose between S1 and S2 without taking L's choices into 
account, a speaker-regarding theory would need to appeal to 
the personal characteristics of S1 or S2 or to the respective 
value of pro-mayoral and anti-mayoral speech. Neither is an 
attractive starting point for a theory of free speech, because it 
is usually thought that any viable theory of free speech ought 
to be largely neutral as to speakers and largely neutral as to 
viewpoints. 
I would say that we should be careful not to mistake many-
to-one cases for one-to-one cases, but that is not quite right, be-
cause every unwilling-listener case has something of a many-to-
one flavor to it. There are so many would-be speakers in the 
world that an unwilling listener is probably being deprived of 
the chance to listen to someone else. Thus, there is an asym-
metry at work. Zoom out from Bored Audience and you may or 
may not find additional listeners, but you will almost always 
find additional speakers. You may or may not be looking at 
Controversial Protest, but you are almost certainly looking at 
Dueling Speeches. 
Indeed, in a world with inexpensive, worldwide, high-
bandwidth, digital media, there are always millions of speakers 
trying to reach every listener in the world. If they had their 
way, everyone would listen to them. Even setting aside these 
speech megalomaniacs, every listener with Internet access is 
always and everywhere faced with a choice among perhaps a 
billion possible speakers: 











The only way that a listener can attend to any one pre-
ferred speaker is by tuning the other billion out. Or, to put a 
sharper point on it, the only way any speaker can ever be heard 
by anyone is by beating out the other billion. It is a minor mir-
acle that speech is possible at all in the modern world. It re-
quires a combination of technologies, norms, and legal support 
to ensure that all the other speakers back off enough that a lis-
tener can hear the one speaker as to whom she is a willing 
listener. And yet, that is what the twenty-first century system 
of freedom of expression accomplishes, billions of times a day. 
Every successful communication from a willing speaker to a 
willing listener is a triumph of listener choice. 










In light of these one-to-many and many-to-one cases, the 
one-to-one cases like Bored Audience should appear in a new 
light. What looks like a one-to-one case may not be: it may be a 
one-to-many case or a many-to-one case in disguise. Both 
Controversial Protest and Dueling Speeches contain Bored 
Audience, which means that even a case matching the Bored 
Audience pattern of a willing speaker facing an unwilling 
listener may not only be about the conflict between them. It 
may match a larger pattern as well, and if it does, we should 
zoom out until we see the other listeners straining to hear and 
the other speakers straining to be heard. 
When there are other willing listeners, their choices as lis-
teners help us break the Bored Audience speaker-listener 
deadlock in favor of the speaker, who has a broader and willing 
audience. And when there are other speakers, this time the 
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listener's choice helps break the Bored Audience deadlock in 
favor of the listener, who is choosing among speakers, not 
merely choosing whether to listen. Narrowly, these 
considerations cut in opposite directions: additional listeners 
give the speaker's desire to speak more weight, while 
additional speakers give the objecting listener's objections more 
weight. But in a broader sense, both of these considerations are 
appeals to listener choice. 
It follows, albeit tentatively, that there are plausible free 
speech reasons to promote listener choice even in one-to-one 
unwilling-listener cases. In Bored Audience and similar cases, 
this means taking the side of the listener rather than the 
speaker. In every other type of case discussed above-willing 
listeners, many-to-one unwilling listeners, and one-to-many 
unwilling listeners-the basic commitments of free speech re-
quired us to adopt a principle of favoring listeners' choices. To 
be sure, we are not required by those commitments to extend 
the listener-choice principle to one-to-one unwilling-listener 
cases, but neither are we prohibited from doing so. Siding 
either with listeners or with speakers-or deciding between 
them on a case-by-case basis-is consistent with those commit-
ments. But given how uniformly the listener-choice principle 
applies in every other type of case, it is plausible and attractive 
in one-to-one unwilling listener cases as well. 
Thus, a listener-choice principle treats one-to-one and one-
to-many cases quite differently: the unwilling listener in a one-
to-one case can have her choices respected, while the unwilling 
listener in a one-to-many case will have to put up with the 
unwanted speech. The reason is not that the unwilling listen-
er's choices themselves are more or less significant in one type 
of case versus the other, but rather that in a one-to-one case a 
listener's choices affect no other listeners, while in a one-to-
many case the listeners' choices are unavoidably intertwined. A 
street-corner orator necessarily reaches multiple listeners, 
whereas a telephone harasser does not bring other listeners 
into the picture. His speech is limited to one highly unwilling 
listener. Serving him with a no-contact order will not interdict 
any speech to a willing listener (because there are no other 
listeners), but it will facilitate the speech of other speakers (be-
cause his victim can go back to reading a novel). 
This is not a conclusive argument for listener choice in all 
settings. The details depend on contextual factors and 
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normative arguments. Different foundational theories of free 
speech will make very different prescriptions here. My point is 
narrower. We end up favoring listeners' choices in many one-to-
one cases without even considering contextual factors and 
normative arguments. 
C. Targeting, Selection, and Separation Costs 
Speakers and listeners don't just have preferences about 
speech, they also act on those preferences. The speaker who 
chases a listener down the block and the listener who runs 
away are engaged in a struggle over whether they will end up 
matched. If one or the other stands still, she concedes to the 
other. 53 
But if speakers' and listeners' actions can create structural 
conflicts, they can also resolve those conflicts. Consider 
Controversial Protest again: 
L1 
L2 
Controversial Protest (redux): S gives a speech criti-
cizing the mayor and would like to reach as many 
listeners as possible. L1 and L2 are within hearing 
range. Li is not interested in listening to S; L2 is. 
53. The possibility of these self-help arms races is another reason that it is 
hard to state categorical rules about one-to-one cases. Compare wearing earplugs 
versus speaking through a megaphone, running away versus chasing after, and 
filtering ads versus evading ad filters: in each case the balance of power between 
listeners and speakers is different. There may be good reasons for the state to step 
in and set limits on how far the arms race can go-effectively picking a winner 
just to have it done with-but those reasons depend heavily on the details of who 
can do what; that is, on what I will shortly call "separation costs." 
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S and L2 form a willing-listener/willing-speaker pair, 
whereas S and L1 have irreconcilably opposed preferences. The 
point of Controversial Protest is that there is an additional 
listener-listener conflict between Li and L2. The state's choice 
of whether or not to silence S can resolve that conflict only by 
the core commitment to disappointing one of the two. Given 
protecting speakers addressing willing listeners, it follows that 
S should be allowed to speak. 
Unlike the conflict between S and L1, which is inherent in 
their preferences, the conflict between Li and L2 is contingent. 
It stems from the assumption that either S speaks-to both Li 
and L2 or S speaks to neither of them. If we relax this assump-
tion, it should be clear that another matching is possible: S 
speaks to L2 but not to L1. 54 
S speaks to L1 & L2 S speaks to L2 S speaks to no one 
S good okay bad 
LI bad good good 
L2 good good bad 
In this matching, both L1 and L2 go home happy because 
their respective preferences (not to listen and to listen) have 
been honored. If we are committed to listener choice, this is a 
distinct improvement over the previously available options of 
speaking to both or to neither. It is still not possible to make 
both S and Li happy. Their preferences conflict no matter 
what. But again, if we are committed to listener choice, we will 
be less bothered by disappointing S than by disappointing L1. 
When Li and L2 participate in a one-to-many case with S, 
their opposed preferences interfere; when they participate in 
distinct one-to-one cases with S, their preferences are inde-
pendent. Every listener does as well or better when a one-to-
many case is transformed into an aggregation of independent 
one-to-one cases. 
54. Of course, there is also the matching in which S speaks to L1 but not to 
L2, but that would just be perverse. Li and L2 would gladly trade places and S 
would not object, so this is not a stable matching. 




That leaves open the question of how to get there from 
here. This is where speakers' and listeners' actions come in. 
Suppose they are in a park, a few dozen feet apart. Any of the 
three of them could go a long way toward solving the problem 
by walking a short way. S could come closer to L2, L2 could 
come closer to S, or Li could go further away from the others. 
No matter who gets up and moves, the end result is the same: 
S can speak in a way that is audible to L2 but not to L1. In 
addition to these unilateral measures, there may be hybrids 
that combine actions from two, or even all three. So S and L2 
could each walk halfway toward the other. Or S could post a 
flyer announcing his intention to speak against the mayor at 
noon by the duck pond. L2, who is interested, will go to the 
duck pond at noon. L1, who is not interested, will stay away. 
Frequently, speakers and listeners voluntarily collaborate 
in this sorting process without any state intervention. Consider 
the description of a book on a dust jacket, which lets readers 
decide whether they want to read the book. The resulting 
sorting into interested readers and disinterested non-readers 
suits both speakers (authors and publishers) and listeners 
(readers). The ubiquity of these collaborative choice structures 
should not blind us to their importance in achieving good 
matchings. 
However it takes place, sorting is not free. Call the costs 
involved "separation costs." In the park example, there is a 
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must move a literal separation: someone to create greater dis-
tance between S and L1 than between S and L2. More often, 
separation is a metaphor. In the book example, the publisher 
pays someone to draft the dust jacket copy and pays to print 
the dust jackets. Readers pay with their time when they skim 
the dust jacket and reflect. These separation costs are willingly 
borne, but they are costs nonetheless. 
Sometimes separation costs may be cheap; sometimes they 
may be prohibitively expensive. Some separation costs will fall 
some on willing listeners to on speakers to target their speech, 
opt themselves in, and some on unwilling listeners to opt them-
selves out. Some separation costs may even fall on third parties 
or the government (perhaps the parks department maintains 
The parties will the bulletin board S used to post the flyer). 
quite naturally prefer that someone else do the necessary work 
of separating willing from unwilling listeners.5 5 To decide 
whether we should expect or require someone to bear separa-
tion costs, we will have to consider their magnitude and inci-
dence and compare these variables to the costs of foregone or 
unwanted speech. 
We should be asking, in a sense, who is the least-cost 
avoider of unwanted speech? The answer to that question will 
always depend on contextual details and frequently on the con-
tent of the speech. But it is possible to make some general 
observations. A few distinctions are significant: 
First, there is a duality between making speakers respon-
sible for targeting their speech only to willing listeners and 
making listeners responsible for selecting only the speech they 
wish to hear. An email marketing list is speaker-targeted; an 
inbox spam filter is listener-selected. Asking listeners to "avert 
their eyes" or make the "short, though regular, journey from 
mail box to trash can"56 requires listener selection; asking tele-
on the Do Not Call list requires marketers not to call numbers 
speaker targeting. 57 
55. Of course, S may prefer that the problem not be solved at all: he has a bet-
ter case to address the unwilling L1 if that is the only way he can reach the will-
ing L2. Not every speaker wants to reach unwilling listeners; musicians want to 
reach fans, not make enemies. But even those speakers who are perfectly willing 
separation not to address unwilling listeners would still prefer not to bear the 
costs. 
56. Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967). 
57. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2018). 
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Second, there is a similar duality between making willing 
listeners opt in and making unwilling listeners opt out. While 
both are species of listener selection, they differ in terms of 
whether willing or unwilling listeners are more responsible for 
taking action. Do Not Call is opt-out. Those who do not wish to 
be called must register with the list. But cable television chan-
nels are opt-in. Those who wish to receive them must affirma-
tively subscribe. 
Third, separation costs depend both on the cost of physi-
cally acting and on the cost of acquiring the necessary 
knowledge on which to act. It is easy to throw junk mail away 
unopened, but harder to tell whether there is junk mail within 
an unmarked envelope. Contrariwise, it is easy to know that 
there is a DJ stage at the block party outside, but not so easy to 
ignore it. 
In general, the lower a party's separation costs, the more 
often First Amendment doctrine asks that party to bear them. 
The argument that unwilling viewers should avert their eyes 
reflects in part a belief that it would be more costly to make 
willing viewers wear special glasses. But the captive audience 
doctrine deals with situations in which unwilling listeners are 
not effectively able to avert their eyes. We do not ask people to 
wear earplugs and blindfolds inside their own homes. 
The law sometimes asks parties to collaborate in lowering 
each other's separation costs. Amplification limits require 
speakers not to use technology that overwhelms listeners' abil-
ity to self-select. 58 Do Not Call requires listeners to volunteer a 
little information that is helpful to accurate speaker targeting. 
Caller ID requires speakers to provide a little information that 
is helpful to accurate listener selection. 
In many real-life settings, the actual system in use is a 
complex hybrid of these various separation techniques. Take 
spam. Our current hybrid system for sorting email expects 
speakers, willing listeners, and unwilling listeners all to play 
their part.59 Unwilling listeners who wish not to receive 
commercial promotions from a given sender are expected to 
make an opt-out request. Senders, however, are required to 
58. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (holding that 
"[t]he city's sound-amplification guideline ... is valid under the First Amendment 
as a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of expression"). 
59. See, e.g., Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2012); 16 C.F.R. pt. 316 (2018). 
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make those opt-outs simple and convenient and to honor such 
requests. 60 To facilitate low-cost selection by unwilling recipi-
ents deciding which emails to read, senders are required not to 
use certain kinds of deceptive metadata in their emails. 61 
Finally, willing recipients who do want a company's mailings 
are frequently expected to affirmatively opt in to promotional 
emails. 62 Notice how these devices are all reasonably low-cost, 
and how none of them interfere directly with speech to a will-
ing listener. They collectively combine to create a system that 
facilitates the separation of willing and unwilling recipients. It 
is hardly a perfect system,- but from a free speech perspective, 
it is far from a disaster either. It does a reasonable job at sepa-
rating willing from unwilling listeners, and thus it facilitates 
speaker and listener choice. 
III. EXAMPLES 
The previous Part made a series of structural claims about 
speaker-listener matching. Despite working at an absurdly 
high level of abstraction, it showed that any coherent system of 
free speech will tend to protect mutually willing speakers and 
listeners, 63 favor willing listeners over unwilling listeners,6 fa-
vor a willing listener's preferred speaker over competing 
speakers, 65 consider protecting unwilling listeners from un-
wanted speakers when other listeners are not implicated, 66 and 
try to help willing and unwilling listeners separate them-
selves. 67 
There is a tentative listener-choice principle running 
through all of these points. Listeners' choices to hear speech 
provide a prima facie reason to permit it. Listeners' choices not 
to hear speech provide a prima facie reason to prevent it, but 
one that can be overcome by other listeners' choices to hear it 
when the two conflict. That conflict, in turn, can be defused 
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012) (making it unlawful for a person to 
send a commercial email that does not contain a functioning opt-out). 
61. Id. § 7704(a)(1). 
62. Id. § 7704(a)(4)(B). 
63. Supra Section II.A. 
64. Supra Section II.B.1. 
65. Supra Section HI.B.2. 
66. Supra Section I.B.3. 
67. Supra Section II.C. 
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when it is possible to disaggregate willing and unwilling listen-
ers' choices. 
To repeat, these principles were derived solely from 
abstract theory and with no reference to the contents of speech 
or listeners' reasons for their choices. Yet they still perform 
surprisingly well when exposed to actual cases involving actual 
speech, speakers, and listeners. This Part examines a few 
canonical Supreme Court cases and finds them consistent with 
these general principles. 
A. Mail 
Start with a matched pair of cases involving the United 
States mail. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court struck 
down a statute interdicting "communist political propa-
ganda."68 In Rowan v. Post Office Department, the Court up-
held a statute allowing householders to prohibit delivery of 
"erotically arousing or sexually provocative" matter.69 The rele-
vant difference between the two was listener choice. 
Lamont dealt with section 305(a) of the Postal Service and 
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, which required the 
Postal Service to detain "communist political propaganda" from 
certain countries mailed into the United States and deliver it 
"only on the addressee's request." 70 The Postal Service imple-
mented the statute by screening all mail from those countries 
and sending a reply card to the addressee of any piece of mail 
determined to be statutory agitprop. 71 If the recipient filled out 
the card and returned it to the Postal Service, it would then 
deliver the mail; but if the card was not returned within twenty 
days, the mail would be destroyed.72 The two cases decided in 
Lamont involved the detention of material that today seems 
almost absurdly tame, such as the public exchange of stilted 
and grandiose open letters between the Chinese and Soviet 
Communist Parties as they jostled over the direction of 
68. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). 
69. 397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970). 
70. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302. A separate statute, the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, defined the term "political propaganda," and section 
305(a) then defined "communist political propaganda" as political propaganda "is-
sued by or on behalf of' certain specified countries. Id. at 302 n.1 (citation omit-
ted). 
71. Id. at 303-04. 
72. Id. 
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international communism. 73 In both cases, the American 
recipients filed suit challenging the constitutionality of section 
305 rather than return the reply card.74 
The Supreme Court avoided standing difficulties by invok-
ing listeners' rights, rather than speakers' rights. 75 The Court 
held that the statute "amounts in our judgment to an unconsti-
tutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment 
rights." 76 Moreover, it justified this conclusion by detailing the 
system's burdens for listeners. The Court noted the "affirma-
tive obligation" it thrust on addressees and the chilling effect of 
needing to request delivery of "communist political propa-
ganda." 77 In a concurrence, Justice Brennan explicitly and 
eloquently grounded willing listeners' rights in the First 
Amendment: 
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific 
guarantee of access to publications. However, the protection 
of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to 
protect from congressional abridgment those equally funda-
mental personal rights necessary to make the express 
guarantees fully meaningful. I think the right to receive 
publications is such a fundamental right. The dissemination 
of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing address-
ees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a 
barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no 
buyers.78 
73. See, e.g., Chinese and Soviet Parties Exchange Letters, PEKING REV., Mar. 
22, 1963, at 1, 6, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/196 3 /PR1 9 6 3 
-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HNQ-JK4K]. 
74. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 304-05. 
75. The senders were located abroad and the mail they sent was issued on be-
half of foreign governments. Thus, not only were the senders not before the court, 
it was unclear that they had any First Amendment rights to assert. See id. at 
307-08 (Brennan, J., concurring). The modern First Amendment status of speech 
by foreigners remains unsettled, although "aliens abroad are presumed not to en-
joy First Amendment rights." Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First 
Amendment: Free Speech at-and Beyond-Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1543, 1549 (2010); see also Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2a 281 
(D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
76. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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Lamont uncontroversially elevated listeners to the same 
plane as speakers. In similar cases where willing speakers and 
willing listeners oppose a government seeking to interpose it-
self between them, it does not particularly matter who is the 
plaintiff. Allowing either to sue when their interests are "inex-
tricably meshed" avoids difficult and distracting questions 
about standing to assert each other's First Amendment 
rights. 79 
Rowan took a further and more interesting step. The 
Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 established a 
procedure for householders to notify the Postmaster General 
that they had received "erotically arousing or sexually provoca-
tive" advertising material from a specified sender.80 Upon 
receiving such a notice, the Postmaster General was required 
to order the sender "to refrain from further mailings to the 
named addressee." 81 Notably, whether the mail was in fact 
arousing or provocative was left to the "sole discretion" of the 
householder, and as the statute was construed by the Court, 
future mailings from that sender to that addressee were 
prohibited regardless of their content.82 
In many respects, the statute in Rowan was the more 
speech-restrictive of the two. It barred speech. outright, rather 
than merely imposing an inconvenience (the reply card) on it. It 
could be applied to any advertising mail, not just mail advo-
cating on behalf of communist governments. It applied to 
United States senders, not just aliens abroad. It imposed the 
threat of coercive punishments against speakers, not just the 
interception of their speech. And it vested a private party with 
unfettered and unreviewable discretion to apply a vague statu-
tory standard. From a speaker-centric perspective, the statute 
79. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974), overruled by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). Procunier involved prisoners' 
correspondence, so by focusing on the rights of their pen pals both as senders and 
as recipients, the Court could sidestep the question of "the extent to which an 
individual's right to free speech survives incarceration." Id. at 408; see also 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (recognizing First Amendment inter-
ests of would-be audiences for a Belgian socialist denied visa to enter the United 
States, while subordinating those interests to the plenary Congressional power to 
exclude aliens). 
80. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1970). 
81. Id. at 730. 
82. Id. at 734-35. 
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in Rowan is more offensive, and with Lamont on the books, it 
seems like an easy case for invalidation. 
But when the Supreme Court decided Rowan, it unani-
mously upheld the statute. 83 Chief Justice Burger's opinion 
rests on listeners' rights as listeners. It starts by acknowledg-
ing the tension between speakers' and listeners' interests: 
But the right of every person "to be let alone" must be 
placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate. 
. . . To make the householder the exclusive and final 
judge of what will cross his threshold undoubtedly has the 
effect of impeding the flow of ideas, information, and argu-
ments that, ideally, he should receive and consider. 84 
As between the two, it clearly favors listeners: 
Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view 
any unwanted communication, whatever its merit; we see 
no basis for according the printed word or pictures a differ-
ent or more preferred status because they are sent by 
mail. 85 
And it finishes with a clear statement of unwilling listen-
ers' place in the First Amendment's scheme: 
We therefore categorically reject the argument that a ven-
dor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send 
unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibi-
tion operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the 
83. Id. at 740. 
84. Id. at 736. I leave for another day a detailed analysis of the role that prop-
erty and privacy interests play in unwilling-listener cases where (as in Lamont 
and Rowan) the unwanted speech is received in the home. See, e.g., Lamont, 381 
U.S. at 304-05; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729, 738. In brief, real property rights provide 
a framework for speech separation through literal, physical separation. "Privacy" 
here is the right to be let alone rather than informational privacy-so appeals to 
privacy merely restate a listener's interest in avoiding unwanted speech, rather 
than providing an independent ground to recognize it. 
85. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737. 
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answer is that no one has a right to press even "good" ideas 
on an unwilling recipient. 86 
The difference between Lamont and Rowan is the willing-
ness or the unwillingness of the listener. Lamont is a simple 
violation of the core willing-speaker, willing-listener free 
speech principle. Rowan comes out as it does because mail is a 
one-to-one medium. The separation problem was substantially 
solved by giving each residence its own postal address. 8 7 Be-
cause mail is individually targetable, it is reasonable to ask 
senders to refrain from mailing unwilling recipients. To be 
sure, it might also be reasonable to ask recipients to throw 
away unwanted mail. But by the logic of listener choice, in a 
one-to-one case, no core violation of free speech is committed if 
we ask senders rather than recipients to bear this cost. 
Moreover, note that the statute in Rowan required unwill-
ing recipients to opt out by sending a reply card, rather than 
requiring willing recipients to opt in. By giving senders one bite 
at the apple, the opt-out rule tends to favor willing listeners 
over unwilling ones, achieving a more speech-protective result. 
It also respects listener choice while imposing a threshold 
condition to ensure that the listener makes a more informed 
choice.88 And a burden that is reasonable for unwilling listen-
ers may not be reasonable for willing ones. The same proce-
dure-sending a reply card-was struck down in Lamont as an 
unconstitutional burden on speech. 
B. Doorbells 
The same distinction appears in the Supreme Court's cases 
on door-to-door solicitation. Consider Martin v. City of 
86. Id. at 738. 
87. Substantially, but not completely. More than one person can live at the 
same address, and they may not all be equally willing or unwilling. The implicit 
assumption that a single head of household speaks for all listeners at the address 
is not always true. The statute in Rowan allowed parents to add the names of 
children nineteen and under to the removal lists; Justice Brennan's concurrence 
raised the possibility that teenagers might be more willing recipients than their 
parents. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
88This is another aspect of the problem in Lamont: postal recipients were re-
quired to make decisions about mail from senders they hadn't yet received any 
mail from; that is, to make uninformed choices about speech. 
404 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
Struthers.89 Struthers, Ohio, had an ordinance prohibiting 
door-to-door distribution of "handbills, circulars or other adver-
tisements." 90 A Jehovah's Witness argued that the ordinance 
was unconstitutional after being fined $10 for violating it.91 
Justice Black's opinion striking down the ordinance under 
the First Amendment is notable for the contrast it draws be-
tween the government's decisions and the homeowner's. In one 
notable passage, it makes the same point four times in three 
sentences: 
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of 
weighing the conflicting interests of the appellant in the 
civil rights she claims, as well as [(1)] the right of the indi-
vidual householder to determine whether he is willing to re-
ceive her message, against the interest of the community 
which by this ordinance offers to protect the interests of all 
of its citizens, [(2)] whether particular citizens want that 
protection or not. The ordinance does not control anything 
but the distribution of literature, and in that respect it [(3)] 
substitutes the judgment of the community for the judgment 
of the individual householder. It submits the distributer to 
criminal punishment for annoying the person on whom he 
calls, [(4)] even though the recipient of the literature distrib-
uted is in fact glad to receive it.92 
Crucially, the opinion explains (albeit in dictum) that laws 
punishing trespass by unwanted callers remain constitutional: 
This or any similar regulation leaves the decision as to 
whether distributers of literature may lawfully call at a 
home where it belongs-with the homeowner himself. A city 
can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the pre-
viously expressed will of the occupant . . 93 
89. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
90. Id. at 142. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added). 
93. Id. at 148. 
405 2019] LISTENERS' CHOICES 
Subsequent case law involving unwanted newspaper deliv-
eries confirms that homeowners can indeed stop unwanted 
speech by giving proper notice. 94 
As before, knocking on doors is a one-to-one medium, so it 
is possible both to protect speakers and to ask them to target 
their speech only to the willing. And also as before, the compro-
mise on the ground requires the unwilling to opt out rather 
than requiring the willing to opt in. The state may enforce a 
homeowner's desire not to be spoken to, but it may not presume 
such a desire, even where the presumption is rebuttable. This 
rule effectively gives speakers the chance to engage listeners to 
see whether they choose to hear more. Some, indeed many, of 
those listeners will not, and these cases arise because listeners 
object to having been bothered. But these ultimately unwilling 
listeners cannot prevail over those who prove willing to enter-
tain the speaker's message. The protection of unwilling listen-
ers' choices both depends on, and is limited by, the protection of 
willing listeners' choices. 
C. Drive-Ins 
Finally, consider Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.9 5 The 
University Drive-In Theatre in Jacksonville screened Class of 
'74, which featured "pictures of uncovered female breasts and 
buttocks." 96 A city ordinance prohibited showing such anatomy 
"if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible from 
any public street or public place." 97 The drive-in's screen was 
visible from two public streets and a church parking lot. A 
prosecution and a declaratory judgment constitutional chal-
lenge ensued, and the Supreme Court eventually found the 
ordinance unconstitutional. 98 
94. See, e.g., Tillman v. Distribution Sys. of Am., 224 A.D.2d 79, 88 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1996) ("The State need not, and in our opinion, should not, compel anyone to 
read, to buy, or even to touch, pick up, or handle a newspaper of which the indi-
vidual in question wants to have no part."); cf. Reddy v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 
991 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (denying relief where homeowner had not 
provided newspaper with notice of his objection). Different considerations apply, 
of course, beyond the home, because there the interests of other listeners besides 
those with property-based exclusionary rights are implicated. 
95. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
96. Id. at 207 n.1. 
97. Id. at 207. 
98. Id. at 206, 217-18. 
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Of Jacksonville's various asserted justifications for the 
ordinance, the only one that need detain us here is the theory 
that the city could "protect its citizens against unwilling expo-
sure to materials that may be offensive." 99 The opinion itself 
presents the issue as a clash between speakers and listeners, 
describing the clash as one "pitting the First Amendment 
rights of speakers against the privacy rights of those who may 
be unwilling viewers or auditors" and calling for "delicate bal-
ancing."100 But outside the home, Justice Powell drew a distinc-
tion: 
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our 
political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Consti-
tution does not permit government to decide which types of 
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to re-
quire protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, 
absent the narrow circumstances described above, the bur-
den normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bom-
bardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] 
eyes."10 1 
Since "the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes" by 
looking away from the drive-in screen, the Court allowed the 
drive-in to continue showing racy B movies. 
This much is standard-issue, unwilling-listener rhetoric. 
But the real story of Erznoznik-the story of willing listeners-
comes in the footnotes. First, the drive-in was not screening 
Class of '74 to shock unsuspecting passersby. It was trying to 
reach willing viewers (also known as paying customers) rather 
than unwilling ones. As footnote 6 observed, "[p]resumably, 
where economically feasible, the screen of a drive-in theater 
will be shielded from those who do not pay." 102 Thus, the ordi-
nance did not simply burden the drive-in as a speaker, it also 
burdened the drive-in's customers as listeners. Footnote 7 
acknowledged that the case involved both "the rights of those 
who operate drive-in theaters and the public that attends these 
99. Id. at 208. As a measure to protect children, the ordinance was overbroad. 
Id. at 212-14. As a traffic control measure, it was underinclusive. Id. at 214-15. 
100. Id. at 208. 
101. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
102. Id. at 211 n.6. 
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establishments."l 03 That makes Erznoznik a one-to-many case. 
To prohibit showing Class of '74 to protect the choices of un-
willing viewers would interfere with the choices of willing 
ones. 104 
An exchange between the dissent and the majority makes 
clear that Erznoznik was a case about separation costs. Chief 
Justice Burger argued in dissent that it was difficult for disin-
terested viewers to look away, saying, "[T]he screen of a drive-
in movie theater is a unique type of eye-catching display that 
can be highly intrusive and distracting." 0 5 But even crediting 
the discredited idea that visual media compel obedience, 
screening out the movies would have been far more difficult on 
the drive-in's end. By one estimate, it might have cost $250,000 
to erect a sufficient wall 06 -a cost so high as to seriously inter-
fere with the drive-in's willingness to speak (and thus its abil-
ity to reach willing listeners). As footnote 7 of the majority 
opinion explained, "The effect of the Jacksonville ordinance is 
to increase the cost of showing films containing nudity. In cer-
tain circumstances theaters will avoid showing these movies 
rather than incur the additional costs. As a result persons who 
want to see such films at drive-ins will be unable to do so." 107 
As between the drive-in and passersby, the latter were the 
least-cost avoiders of the speech conflict here. 
This point deserves amplification. When we deal with un-
wanted one-to-many speech, we are always asking at least two 
questions. The first is a question of separation costs: whether 
we are truly dealing with a one-to-many case or simply with 
the aggregation of numerous but independent one-to-one cases. 
Only once we have an answer to this question about the 
dynamics of the situation can we properly consider the speech 
itself and the question of its value or harm to speakers and 
listeners. Cases like Erznoznik that make sweeping statements 
about what listeners must endure may in fact stand only for 
103. Id. at 212 n.7. 
104. Indeed, there is more than a hint in the case that the problem from 
Jacksonville's point of view was not unwilling viewers on public streets but will-
ing ones. Justice Powell's recitation of the facts states, "[t]here was also testimony 
indicating that people had been observed watching films while sitting outside the 
theater in parked cars and in the grass." Id. at 207. One does not take a seat near 
a drive-in to avoid the movie; one takes a seat to enjoy it. 
105. Id. at 222 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 213 n.8. 
107. Id. at 212 n.7. 
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much narrower propositions about what they must endure 
when targeting is infeasible. Mail and knocking on doors are 
targetable, drive-in theaters much less so. These kinds of cases 
raise different issues, and it is not possible to lump all unwill-
ing-listener cases together. We must be more careful about the 
actual structure of the flows of speech from speakers to listen-
ers and about whose choices influence those flows. Only then 
can we properly articulate whose interests are truly at stake, 
and what conflicts the law must mediate. 
CONCLUSION 
Speaker-listener matching is a general, rigorous, and illu-
minating way of analyzing difficult First Amendment prob-
lems. It provides a new and useful way of understanding how 
speaking and listening are different but interdependent, it 
identifies the relevant relationships in First Amendment cases. 
It does not always apply, but when it does, it helps bring out 
recurring patterns. 
One such pattern, which I have discussed in detail, is lis-
tener choice. This is a golden age for scholarship on listeners' 
rights.1 08 Recent work includes powerful normative arguments 
for putting listeners alongside speakers at the center of free 
speech theory and thoughtful listener-oriented analyses of a 
diverse array of First Amendment doctrines. Those who are 
committed to listeners' rights may find the matching frame-
work congenial for a few reasons. First, it provides a concrete 
way of recognizing listeners' agency, because it focuses on their 
choices rather than on their interests. 109 Second, it shows that 
listeners make choices for speakers and not just against them, 
which helps align listeners' and speakers' rights. Third, it 
shows how some conflicts among speakers and listeners can be 
accidents of history, so that with appropriate physical, 
108. The literature on listeners' rights is extensive, and a proper survey would 
require an article-length literature review. In addition to the other articles in this 
issue, significant recent highlights include BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON'S MUSIC: 
ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2015); Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights 
for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2007); Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, 
SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 2481 (2017); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based 
Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011). 
109. And speakers' choices, but speakers have not suffered from lack of atten-
tion to their choices. 
409 2019] LISTENERS' CHOICES 
technical, or legal interventions, the conflicts dissolve. And 
fourth, it shows that listener choice really is a recurring 
pattern: 
* In one-to-many cases, willing listeners' choices prevail over 
unwilling listeners' choices. 
* In many-to-one cases, listeners' choices break the deadlock 
among competing speakers. 
* In one-to-one cases (once they are properly distinguished 
from one-to-many cases) unwilling listeners' choices are less 
of a threat to free speech than they are sometimes said to 
be. 
* Some one-to-many cases can be disaggregated into one-to-
one cases through appropriate separation, and this dis-
aggregation promotes listener choice. 
These observations are pragmatic rather than profound. 
They are not an argument for listeners' rights across the board. 
Instead, they suggest that in a world with many competing 
speakers and many diverse listeners, the structural limits of 
speaker-listener matching will tend to push any system of free-
dom of expression towards respecting listeners' choices. 
But listeners' rights are not the only direction in which the 
theory of speaker-listener matching can go. I would like to 
briefly sketch another, which I think is equally important. We 
have a tradition of free speech theory and First Amendment 
doctrine that obsesses over the problem of bandwidth scar-
city. 110 Much of what we think we know about speakers and lis-
teners-think of spectrum, public fora, and compelled 
disclosures, to name just a few-takes it for granted that law 
will have to mediate conflicts among speakers and listeners 
over limited speech-transmission resources. But in this centu-
ry, the scarcities that matter are attention and information, not 
bandwidth. The problem is not that speakers have a hard time 
reaching listeners, or that listeners are denied the ability to 
hear the speech they want. The problem is that listeners are 
flooded with speech, far more than they can possibly listen to, 
and that they know extremely little about that speech, so little 
110. The canonical text is Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). It has been cited by 596 articles 
in the HeinOnline database as of September 23, 2018. 
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that they can't even make minimally-informed choices about 
which speech to listen to. 
"Fake news" is a bad way to describe the problem, but the 
problem is there, whether we have a good term for it or not. 111 
Something has gone very wrong with the matching process in 
the last few years, especially but not exclusively online, some-
thing that is hard even to see from within traditional content-
focused theories of free speech. Fake news and filter bubbles 
are problems of attention and ignorance. 112 They have to do 
with the content of speech, yes, but much more to do with how 
content spreads from speakers to listeners. 113 
Free speech theory needs to come to grips with attention 
and ignorance as foundational concepts. 114 In an age of virality, 
presidential tweets, and recommendation engines run amok, 
attention is the resource that powerful speakers fight over, and 
listener ignorance is often their weapon of choice. 115 Preserving 
a safe space for a democratic culture will require both new 
efforts to protect attention from hijacking and also new tools to 
channel attention to places where it can be used for good. 116 
The truly unifying work on a coherent First Amendment law of 
attention and ignorance remains to be written. I hope that it 
will not be long. The problem is urgent. 
111. Some sources on the issues involved include ROBYN CAPLAN ET AL., DATA 
& SoC'Y, DEAD RECKONING: NAVIGATING CONTENT MODERATION AFTER "FAKE 
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112. On filter bubbles, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED 
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Speech, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-
issue-tech-turmoil-new-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/EX97-XGGM]. 
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